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Mechanism Design with Public Goods: Committee Karate,  
Cooperative Games, and the Control of Social Decisions through Subcommittees 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Axioms from social choice theory and the core of cooperative games in effectiveness form are 
used to design an organization that influences a voting group to choose the alternative preferred 
by a designer. The designer has information about individual preferences and can dictate 
organization but cannot dictate choice. The designer’s influence works through decision centers 
(subcommittees). Subcommittee memberships, subcommittee separation, the alternatives 
available to the subcommittees, the chairpersons and voting rules can be used to create games 
with appropriate configurations of cores that result in group decisions according to the designer's 
wishes. The institutions leave considerable flexibility to subcommittee decisions and appear to 
be fair.  Manipulation is not detected.  Core alternatives emerge as the group choice.  Conflicting 
individual preferences enable organizational structures such that a wide range of alternative can 
be made the solution. Experiments demonstrate that the resulting model is a very accurate 
predictor of the group choice.  
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Mechanism Design with Public Goods: Committee Karate, 
Cooperative Games and the Control of Social Decisions through Subcommittees* 
 
Charles R. Plott and Brian Merlob 
California Institute of Technology 
 
1. Introduction 
This study extends the literature that explores how social and group organization can be used for 
the purpose of influencing group choice. The theme is captured by the word “influence” but the 
emphasis is on the word “how”. Riker 1(1986) coined the term “heresthetics” to describe the art 
of political manipulation.
 2
.  Gerrymandering is a recognized example.
3
. But, “committee karate” 
or “organization karate” might be a more descriptive term.  Axiomatic social choice theory and 
recent developments in the theory of cooperative games are used as the foundation for the theory 
and results. Laboratory experimental methods are used.  
 
The problem is easy to state.  An organization consisting of a group of people (ten in our case) 
must choose one option from a set of options (fifteen in our case). Individual preferences differ; 
are well formed with certainty and are not publically known. Individual preferences are partially 
known to an administrator, possibly as a result of interviews and private conversations or other 
sources available to administrators.  Thus, preference revelation, the traditional challenge of 
design, is not an issue. The administrator has personal preferences over the group choice.  No 
private goods are available so the administrator cannot bribe or use selective motivations to 
shape voting choices. The practical objective is to design an organization that can function under 
a wide set of parameters and provide the administrator with a set of controls to adjust so the 
system will consistently produce as an outcome the alternative the administrator wants. A 
process design that successfully manipulates should be perceived as being “fair” even though the 
goals implemented and the mechanism itself might be strongly rejected if the decision making 
body’s informed opinion were to be consulted about design objectives. 
 
*The financial support of the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political Science 
are gratefully acknowledged.   
                                                 
1 William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.   
2 Riker emphasized the role of language in addition to institutions and procedures as an important ingredient of the art of 
heresthetics. The emphasis of committee karate is on organizational structure. The influence of procedures on committee 
decisions is well established. See Plott and Levine (1977); Levine and Plott (1978) 
3
 See Christopher Chambers and Alan Miller (2013) for geometric illustrations of the consequences of 
gerrymandering and attempts to control it.  
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The research purpose is to produce such a mechanism, characterize tools that support successful 
design and explain why they work.  Many successful mechanisms might exist. The mechanism 
studied here consists of two independent and separated decision making centers, viewed as 
subcommittees, each of which chooses from among a subset of the options. The two choices are 
elevated to a vote by the organization as a whole. Subcommittees follow a majority rule voting 
process with open proposals and voting following pre-defined procedures. The administrator 
influences the ultimate choice through the assignment of members to the centers/subcommittees, 
the chairpersons and the options (the committee charges) from which the centers/committees 
must choose.  
 
The paper consists of a body of theory and a set of experiments.  The theory is taken from voting 
theory, cooperative game theory, and social choice theory.  The theory outlines individual 
behaviors, how they interact with the institutions to produce the social choices and how they 
confer such power to an administrator.  The experiments explore the accuracy of the theory and 
ask two broad questions.
4
 (1) The first is a proof of principle. Does the mechanism do what it is 
supposed to do? Basically, does the mechanism produce the group choices that it was designed to 
get? (2) The second is design consistency. Does the mechanism operate according to the 
principles on which the design rests?  The underlying principles are important for reliability and 
scalability. If the success is accidental, then there is no reason to think that the mechanism can be 
scaled in terms of size or environment. 
 
Section 2. Overview  
The theory is constructed from well-known axioms from social choice theory and game theory 
and will be recognized immediately by specialists.  However, the modifications, interpretations, 
connections and integration are not so well known.  Section 3 outlines the basic concepts, 
elements and notation appropriate for the application of the theory.  Section 4 is an example of 
the background theory and its application to voting.  
 
Section 5 develops the institutional structure and behavioral theory. Two levels of theory are 
studied.  One level applies to the behavior of centers (subcommittees) when operating in 
isolation and addresses how a subcommittee choice can be influenced. The tools are taken from 
                                                 
4
 The questions that guide the experimental procedures were posed Plott (1994) as a methodology for assessing testbed 
experiments for newly designed mechanisms and decision processes.  
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theories of cooperative games, majority rule equilibrium and the core as formulated through 
cooperative game theory in effectiveness form. 
 
The second level of theory applies to the relationship between different parts of an organization. 
Manipulation works through a type of "divide and concur" strategy that works if the divided 
parts are kept divided. The administrator's control operates through multiple, separated centers.  
The theory addresses the properties of institutions needed to assure that subcommittee decisions 
are insulated from each other and thus avoid unwanted influence of coalitions, communication, 
and other variables that game theory demonstrates are important.  The key property is an 
adaptation from classical, axiomatic social choice theory. 
 
The overall institutional design is simple.  A social goal or “target” is identified and the 
organization is structured to produce the target as the group decision. The “organization chart” 
that explains the decision center organization is illustrated in Figure 1. The administrator creates 
two decision centers (subcommittees), assigns the membership, and defines the task of each.  
Each subcommittee will convene to choose one element from the set of options defined as the 
committee’s task.  The procedure used by the subcommittees is strict majority rule according to a 
simplified version of Roberts Rules of Order with the default, presumably a status quo, 
designated by the administrator that will be the committee choice if the committee fails to choose 
any other alternative.  The two options that emerge as the two committee choices will then be 
voted on by the committee of the whole.  
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Figure 1 Organization Chart – Each subcommittee is assigned a subset of options and members. 
From among the options assigned, each subcommittee makes a choice. Then, the committee as a 
whole (the set of all members) makes a decision between the two choices.
 
 
Section 6 outlines the experimental testbed, the induced preferences and the details of the 
institutions. The logic of the testbed is simply to create an institutional and preference 
environment and ask, through a series of tests, if the social choices respond as predicted.  
 
The experiments consist of a fixed set of options and fixed set of preference types, which remain 
unchanged throughout the experiments. The preference type assignments to individuals were 
systematically changed.  Two different mechanisms are studied. One is based on a majority rule 
equilibration model and the other is based on a veto player game model. A set of target options is 
designated and tested in a series of trials. For each of the designated targets, the theory is applied 
in a trial to craft an organization and procedures to influence the group to choose the target 
option while leaving all individual committee members preferences unchanged.
5
  The 
experiments demonstrate that the target option of a trial tends to be the group choice as 
predicted. 
                                                 
5
 The theories  rest on well-established experimental results for committees operating under majority rule and elements of 
Roberts Rules of order.  The predictive power of the majority rule equilibrium and Condorcet winner was experimentally 
demonstrated by Fiorina and Plott (1978) and replicated and explored further by Berl, et.al (1976), McKelvey and Ordeshook 
(1984), Herzberg and Wilson (1991).  The impact of a single veto player and the core as a solution concept was established by 
Kormendi and Plott (1982) and extended by Isaac and Plott (1978).  The analysis was extended to the case where all participants 
are veto players by Grether, Issac and Plott (2001). Recent reviews of the power and versatility of the underlying theory and be 
found at Bottom, King, Handlin and Miller (2008) and at Wilson (2008a. 2008b.).  Kagel, Song and Winter (2010) studied 
proposal and veto powers in the context of a three person bargaining model. 
Subcommittee 1 Subcommittee 2
Choice ChoiceMembers
1 32
5 ...4
Decision
Options
A
B
C
D
E
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Section 7 contains the precise predictions of the model when applied to the testbed.  As stated in 
the introduction, the questions are whether or not the mechanism does what it is supposed to do 
and whether or not it does it for the right reasons. Section 8 reports the details of the 
experimental procedures.  
 
Section 9 is a statement of results. Overall, the process worked well to produce the target 
alternatives.  The models tended to match the data.  Section 10 is a summary of results.  
Appendices contain details of preference inducement and aspects of the technologies used in 
experiments. 
 
Section 3. Notation, Institutions and Solution Concepts 
A social choice function expressed as a function of the environment represents the theoretically 
predicted outcomes of a decision process.  The environment consists of the feasible alternatives, 
individual preferences, decision making rules and status quo. The choice itself is a subset of the 
possible outcomes, interpreted as the solution of an underlying game as defined by the 
environment. 
 
A. Notation  
Y = a universal set of conceivable alternatives over which individuals have preferences.  
X = the set of feasible alternatives available and from which a choice is made.  The set of 
feasible alternatives is a subset of the set of conceivable alternatives, X Y. 
N = the set of all individuals iN 
Ri = the preference relation of individual i N, with x Ri y or as x  i y.  Where R is the set of all 
total preorders over Y, Ri  R and (R1,…,RN)  R
N
. 
Let D be all asymmetric and irreflexive binary relations on Y.  For a dominance relation D D, 
xDy means x “dominates” y in a sense to be made more precise later. 
A social dominance function, D(R1,…,RN)  R
N
 , is a mapping that assigns to each vector of 
preferences (R1,…,RN)  R
N
 a dominance relation.   
 
A (game form) social choice function, C(X, x0, D(R1 ,..Ri ,..RN )) X, is defined by the 
following properties:  (i)  a set of options X, (ii) a “status quo”, x0, which assures that the 
outcome will be one of the alternatives as opposed to the empty set, (iii) a vector of individual 
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preferences (R1,…,RN), and (iv) a dominance relation D(R1,…,RN) reflecting the underlying 
rules the group choice.   
 
B. Institutions  
Institutions reflect the rules of the game, the game form, and are represented by winning and 
blocking coalitions in a game in effectiveness form.
 6
  For the analysis developed here the rules, 
the winning and blocking coalitions, are fixed in the sense that they do not change as the 
preferences of a decision making group change. 
 
We say that a coalition c  N is a “winning” coalition if the rules grant the coalition the power to 
implement any element of the set of options , X,  as the social choice.  The concept is defined 
relative to some fixed set of options X and its subsets.  Thus, the winning coalitions given a set 
of options X need not be the same as the winning coalitions given a disjoint set Y. The games we 
will consider are “proper” games in the sense that if c is a winning coalition then its complement 
is not winning. A “blocking” coalition is a subset of every winning coalition.   
W = cN such that c is a winning coalition. So if cW, then , c = N\c and c   W. 
B = cN such that if  bB the bc for all cW.7 It follows that if a coalition, c, is blocking for a 
pair (x,y) in X then it is blocking for all pairs in X. 
                                                 
6 The basic connection with cooperative game theory in environments with public goods and no side payments evolves from 
Robert W. Rosenthal (1972).   
7 The concept of blocking can be interpreted as flowing from  group rights. While concepts of individual and group rights are not 
studied here,  generalizations open the door for additional applications of committee karate. 
 Blocking coalitions can be defined relative to pairs of options.  If blocking is defined relative to pairs, some of the 
restrictions of simple games are relaxed and the concept of blocking can become connected to a wider spectrum of institutions. 
Let (x,y) be the set of coalitions for which x cannot dominate y unless the coalition prefers x to y. That is, if a coalition c is an 
element (x,y) then the system cannot move from y to x  (or “move to consider” x over y) unless all members of c prefer x to y. 
Notice that the family of coalitions in (x,y) can change as the pair (x,y) changes and that the agents that have blocking power 
over (x,y) might have no blocking power or influence over the different pair (w,z). Such a representation is natural when the 
options are divided for choice among different subcommittees where the subcommittees are viewed as participating in different 
games.  
 The structure of  (x,y) can  be used to define individual and group rights. For example, if one postulates that i is in all c in 
(x,z) for all z, then i can prevent moves to x (the system cannot move to x unless i agrees) or in (z,x) for all z, which means 
that the system cannot move away from x unless c agrees (if the system gets to x it cannot move away from x unless i agrees). 
The concept reflects a type of “private rights”.  One can think of x as having some dimension (such as a good or activity to be 
allocated or some type of externality) that affects i.  The concept can be refined further to reflect sets of options (i) and (i) over 
which i has such control.  That is, the relation xDy is blocked if x (i) and i does not prefer x to y and the relation yDx is 
blocked if x(i) and i does not prefer y to x. Hammond (1997) makes this distinction in terms one way rights and two way 
rights. The concepts extend themselves to the rights of groups and in doing so can be used to formalize the concept of an 
“amendment control rule” found in Shepsle (1979) and in Shepsle and Weingast (1984). Additional, powerful rules that impact 
the structure of blocking powers derived from parliamentary procedures are found in Schwartz (2006, 2008). 
 Generalization can also be achieved through a relaxation of dominance to the case where blocking coalition is indifferent.  
For example, such a change of definition would be needed to allow exchanges between others, i.e. changes of the social state that 
do not change the component over which an individual has rights. 
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The concept of “dominance” is derived from the abstract concepts of “power” and “preference” 
of coalitions c N. The concept of “power” reflects the nature of institutions or the “rules of the 
game” as defined by the concepts of winning and blocking coalitions. Alternative x “dominates” 
alternative y, written xDy, if there exists a winning coalition that unanimously prefers x to y.  
 
More generally if D(R1 ,..Ri ,..RN ) is a dominance function as defined by decision making rules 
then xDy, if there exists a winning coalition that unanimously prefers x to y given the 
preferences (R1 ,..Ri ,..RN ).   
 
C. Game Solutions as System Choice 
8
 
The condition that the social choice be a subset of the feasible set of options, X, allows a 
connection  to notions of equilibria  and “game solutions”. For this paper only, one solution 
concept will be used (the core of the game). While other solution concepts
9
 exist, only the core is 
used here. 
 
The core is the set of x in X that are undominated: Core = {xX: for all y X, yDx}. 
So the social choice is the core if  
C(X, x0 , D (R1 ,..Ri ,..RN )= {xX: for all y X, yDx}. 
Since N and X are finite,  the core is non empty if a blocking coalition exists. Of particular 
importance is a special institutional structure that Brown (1973) identifies as a collegium in 
which the blocking coalition becomes a winning coalition by being joined with select, disjoint 
subsets of the individuals. 
 
D. Design Goals and Objectives 
The concept of design reflects an effort to find underlying processes such that for every situation 
of feasible alternatives and individual preferences the resulting equilibria, the social choice, is 
what the designer wants the outcome to be. The goals of the design can be specified as a choice 
function representing what the social choice “should be” (or “should not be”) according to the 
criteria of the designer. Where X  Y, the goals can be represented as 
                                                 
8 The connection between the social preference as found in social choice theory and dominance as found in cooperative game 
theory is first introduced by Wilson (1972).  
9 An example is the Von Neuman Morgenstern solution. It is a set, VM X : {x,y VM  xDy and yDx}{ y VM  x 
VM such that xDy} The VM solutions can be families of sets. Other solution concepts are outlined for committee process in 
Isaac and Plott (1978). 
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S( X, x0 , R1 ,..Ri ,..RN ) X. 
The design objective can be stated as S being equal to the social choice 
S( X, x0 , R1 ,..Ri ,..RN ) = C(X, x0 , D (R1 ,..Ri ,..RN ))   X . 
The criteria of success could be stated as a subset, superset or non intersection as oppose to the 
equality sign, S(.) =C(.).  The subtle distinction plays a role in the concept of “error” when 
assessing the accuracy of the design.  In the sections that follow a goal of equality will be 
assumed so the nature of all model errors can be measured and examined.  
 
Section 4. Example: Theory and Computation Applied to a Single Committee and 
Alternative Rules   
The process to be studied consists of “centers” that operate separately and can be modeled as 
separate committees.  This section analyzes one such decision center.  The entire process to be 
tested is outlined in the next section, Section 5.   
 
Consider a committee of three people, {1,2,3}, that must decide on one of three feasible 
alternatives, {x,y,z} and have preferences: {1: xy z;  2: xzy;  3: zyx}.The majority 
rule preference order is a transitive binary relation, xzy. 
 
Two concepts are central.  The first, a Condorcet winner, is an alternative that, when compared 
to any other alternative, is strictly preferred by a majority.  It would beat all other options in a 
head to head majority vote. In the example the Condorcet winner is x.   
 
The second concept is the core. Given the individual preferences in the example, the dominance 
relation is x D z, x D y and z D y.   the core is x and it is also the Condorcet winner.  
 
Figure 2 Dominance Relation Matrices – Each cell (α, β) represents a dominance relation such 
that the cell is 1 if D  and – 1 if D.  If we let the matrix 𝑀 represent the dominance relation 
for simple majority rule and 𝐶 represent the preference for the chairman, we derive the 
dominance relation 𝑀 + 𝐶 for the game. An option is undominated if its associated column only 
has values less than or equal to 1; hence, in the example above, the core is the pair {𝑋, 𝑍}.  For 
simple majority rule an option with a non-positive column is in the core, e.g. X in the matrix M. 
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   𝑋   𝑌   𝑍 
𝑀 =
𝑋
𝑌
𝑍
[
      1    1
−1   −1
−1    1    
] 
   𝑋   𝑌   𝑍 
𝐶 =
𝑋
𝑌
𝑍
[
   −1 −1
   1    −1
   1    1    
] 
   𝑋   𝑌   𝑍 
𝑀 + 𝐶 =
𝑋
𝑌
𝑍
[
      0    0
   0    −2
   0    2    
] 
 
Consider now a rule that gives some agent blocking power. For the computation of the core a 
matrix representation of binary relations will be a useful tool. The dominance relation for simple 
majority rule is represented by the matrix M in Figure 2 in which the cell (,) is 1 if D and it 
is -1 if D.  If the cell (,) is 0, then no dominance exists between the pair. In the matrix 
representation for simple majority rule, a column with only non-positive entries represents an 
undominated alternative. The column for x in the matrix M has no positive entries and thus x is 
in the core. The absence of positive entries means nothing dominates x. 
 
Consider an alternative process that operates by majority rule but the rules give individual 3 
blocking power in the sense that the rules put individual 3 in every winning coalition.  That is, no 
majority coalition can exercise its power unless individual 3 is in favor of it but the preference of 
individual 3 must be backed by a majority in order to establish dominance. Dominance between 
a pair, for instance, x and y, requires a majority preference plus the preference of individual 3 so 
individual 3 alone does not constitute a winning coalition.  In the matrix notation of Figure 2, the 
majority preference is represented by the matrix M.  The preference of individual 3 is 
represented by C and the dominance relation is derived by adding M and C to get the matrix 
M+C. Recall that dominance requires unanimity of members of a winning coalition, which in the 
case can be stated as a majority plus individual 3..  As before if the cell (,) is 1 if D and it is 
-1 if D.  An alternative is undominated if its associated column contains only numbers less 
than 2. . In the matrix, M+C the columns associated with x and z have only numbers less than 
two  and thus the core is the pair {x,z}. The dominance relation is only zDy because #3 and the 
majority prefer z to y but for all other pairs the majority is blocked because the preference of #3 
is the opposite of the majority. The alternative y is dominated by z but both x and z are 
undominated. The computational method can be generalized to cases in which the blocking 
coalition contains more than one person.
10
 
 
                                                 
10
 Let the cell entry be 1 if the blocking coalition be 1, -1, 0 if the blocking coalition unanimously prefers   to , 
unanimously prefers, to  or is not unanimous. The Pareto Optimal options for the blocking coalition will always 
be in the core but the core can contain additional elements.. 
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Note that if a blocking coalition is a single person, as will be the case in much of the theory 
applied in the paper, then the most preferred alternative of that person is always in the core. The 
column of the most preferred alternative of the blocking individual contains no positive elements 
in the matrix representation (the Z column for individual 3 in our example). The most preferred 
alternative of the blocking player cannot be dominated and is thus in the core, although the core 
can contain additional elements.  
 
Section 5. An Organization Designed for Control: Structure and Theory 
The organization  consists of (i) decision centers, (ii) the powers, charges or tasks assigned to 
decision centers, (iii) individual assignments to decision centers, and (iv) procedures to be 
followed within decision centers.   In the absence of a language to define complex institutions, 
we follow the tradition of social choice theory and employ a system of axioms that characterize 
the variables that will and will not influence specific parts of the organization.  Organization is 
defined in terms of behavior as opposed to institutional detail. 
 
A. Decision Centers as Choice Functions. 
The jurisdictions, the tasks assigned to decision centers, are fixed sets of options from which the 
center must choose one alternative. Jurisdictions do not overlap.  
Let Nk be the individuals assigned to the decision center k and let Xk be the jurisdiction of center 
k.  Thus Xk is the set of alternatives assigned to the center and the task (the charge or 
jurisdiction) of the center is to produce a choice from the feasible set of alternatives assigned to 
it.  The jurisdiction assigned to k is a subset of a larger set of options, X, available to the 
organization as a whole,  XkX  Y where Y is some universal set of alternatives.   
 
Decision center choices reflect preferences of decision center members.  Assume Ri is the 
preference relation for iNk. The vector of preferences of the individuals of the center is (R1 ,..Ri 
,..RNk ) = (Ri, iNk).  In addition, it has a default option  xk  Xk, which is the choice of the 
committee should the deliberations of the committee lead to no decision.  For purposes of design 
and modeling, we can represent the decision center k as a choice function. 
Ck(Xk, xk , (Ri, iNk)) Xk 
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B. Decision Center Autonomy:  
Predictability and control of center choices require that the decision centers operate with 
autonomy, independently from each other and from other parts of the organization.
11
  The 
following axiom, captures the idea that two centers act as independent games and is very familiar 
to social choice theorists.
12
  It captures the property of a center as an independent system and is a 
necessary condition for “implementability” in the sense of social choice functions compatibility 
with the solution of a game. 
 
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives (IFA): 
If R = (R1,…,RN) are preferences over Y and if XY and if R

 = R\X then 
C(X, x0,R) = C(X, x0, R

). R\X indicates the restriction of R to the elements of X, i.e. [ for all i 
and for all  x,y X, xRi y x R

i
 
y]. 
 
A decision center is said to act with autonomy if its choice function satisfies IFA. If the choice 
function satisfies IFA, then the outcome of the choice is not influenced by individual preferences 
for items that are not feasible.  The condition requires that the blocking powers of a decision 
center do not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the center and that for pairs of options in the 
jurisdiction only members of the center are members of winning coalitions.  Autonomy requires 
that decisions made by members of a center do not anticipate or  influence decisions in other 
centers. Subgroup meetings, or caucuses by subgroups of a given center or multiple centers, are 
not allowed.  Presumably, their existence could the loss of control and a reduction in the success 
of the manipulation. The axiom rules out strategic behavior in decisions over subsets that will 
subsequently be part of another choice and rules out the influence of decisions made by other 
                                                 
11
  The rich and variable possibilities of coalition formation are reviewed by Debraj Ray and Rajiv Vohra (2014, forthcoming). 
The structure of the theory predicts that coalition formation is a natural tendency that can occur spontaneously in groups.  The 
role of the axiom is to capture the existence of institutions that prevent their formation.  Similarly, the intent of the axiom is to 
capture the existence of institutions and information control that prevent strategic voting that is known to occur naturally.  (See 
Bonoit, 2006).   
12 The axiom is a modification of the Arrow axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives with a status quo variable added 
and without the strong properties of rational social choice used by Arrow.  Plott (1976) recognized that IFA is a necessary 
condition for implementability of social choice functions as solutions to a game.  To see the connection with implementability 
one need only notice that the concept of implementability, as found in the social choice literature, considers only preferences on 
the feasible set and defines the choice to be a (non-empty) subset of the feasible set.  The property is also easy to see in the case 
of cooperative game theory since the dominance relation is not defined for infeasible alternatives. No coalition has the power to 
implement an alternative that is not feasible. Similarly, in the case of non-cooperative games no strategy can lead to a infeasible 
outcome so preferences for the infeasible cannot influence the outcome. Related discussions can be found at Koray and Yildiz 
(2013). 
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decision centers.  It also rules out “strength of preference” variables other than those that might 
be reflected in a marginal rate of substitution. 
 
 
The model is neutral about exactly what institutions guarantee the property. However, if the 
institutions do not guarantee choice behavior that satisfies IFA, then the model may not work.  
 
C. Assignment of Individuals to Decision Centers 
Membership in a decision center is assigned. Self-selection is not allowed. Center membership is 
not endogenous.  Only the preferences of the group assigned to the center have standing as the 
individual preferences that determine the center’s outcome.  
 
In summary, the organization of a decision center reflects two properties. First, only those 
assigned to the decision center contribute to the choice function. Second, due to IFA, the 
decision center’s choice is insensitive to changes in the preferences of individuals outside the 
center. It is also insensitive to changes in members’ preferences for options that are outside the 
center’s jurisdiction.  
 
D. Committee Procedures 
Procedures are assigned to decision centers and cannot be changed by the center and do not 
respond to individual preferences. The procedures begin with the status quo placed as the motion 
on the floor. The floor is open for amendments, which much be recognized and seconded. An 
amendment that passes a strict majority becomes the motion on the floor. If a proposed 
amendment fails to get a strict majority the motion on the floor remains. The following rules are 
imposed and govern committee procedures. 
 
D.1. Any member of the committee can seek recognition and if recognized, places an 
amendment. If multiple members seek recognition within the timeframe, recognition is 
exercised through an independent, equally likely random draw. Any motion can be 
proposed at any time. In particular, a motion that just failed can be proposed again. 
 
D.2. Motion Seconds, the Role of Chairman and open rules vs closed rule procedures. 
All motions require a second.  Two different rules are implemented for study and form 
the basis of the two different mechanisms. Under conditions of the open rule (a type of 
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Roberts Rules), any member of the committee, other than the member that made the 
proposal, can second the motion. Once the motion is seconded, it goes directly to a vote 
by the committee. Under the closed rule or Committee Chairman sessions, only the 
chairman has the power to second. Any motion recognized is proposed, but only those 
motions that are seconded by the chairman can proceed to a vote by the committee. 
Motions not seconded fail and the floor is open for new motions.  Since a Chairman can 
always “entertain” a proposal for someone else to propose, whether or not the chairman 
has the power to propose seems to be a minor issue.  
 
D.3. Ending rules. 
Any committee member recognized can propose to end the debate and vote on the motion 
on the floor as the final choice.  The motion must receive a second in order to be voted 
on. The second can come from any member of the committee that is not the proposer. 
 
D.4. Role of status quo. 
Should the committee fail to make a decision, the status quo is chosen. The decision 
process starts at the status quo. If any motion passes, the decision process moves away 
from the status quo so the status quo will not be chosen unless it is proposed and returns 
as the motion on the floor.  
If only two options exist, then a tie after repeated votes results in the choice of the status 
quo.  
 
E. Organizational Choice and Manipulation 
The discussion now turns to the relationship between center choices and the choice of the 
organization as a whole. Against the background of some universal set of alternatives Y, let the 
set or options available to the organization be XY, and partition the X into two sets, XA and XB.  
Choose two defaults, x0A and x0B plus x0, which is the default for the committee of the whole.  
Let N be the members of the organization and partition them into two sets NA and NB. The 
organizational decision process consists of two separate subcommittees plus a committee of the 
whole. Subcommittees chose an alternative from their jurisdictions, respectively, and report the 
decisions to the committee of the whole. The committee of the whole then decides from the 
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narrowed set of two options chosen by the subcommittees respectively. The organizational 
structure is formally represented as: 
C(X, x0,Ri iN) = C(CA(XA, x0A, Ri iNA)  CB(XB, x0B, Ri iNB), x0,Ri iN) 
The committee as a whole should be faced with two alternatives. The vote between the two 
alternatives is the final committee choice. 
 
Successful manipulation follows if one of the two final options is the alternative preferred by the 
designer and the other is an alternative that will be defeated by a majority vote when placed 
against the alternative preferred by the designer.  Thus the designer must know some options that 
the target option can beat in a majority contest.   Given the two final options desired as the 
runoff, the focus of the design then folds back to the creation of subcommittee processes that will 
lead to their choice.  To these ends, the designer chooses subcommittee tasks and subcommittee 
membership such that the core of each subcommittee is the alternative that the designer wants 
that subcommittee to choose.  In essence, the target consists of three alternatives, one for each 
subcommittee and one of those two is the target for the committee of the whole. 
 
Section 6. The Experimental Testbed 
The testbed proceeds in a series of periods within a fixed environment and in each period 
applying the manipulation method outlined in the previous section to get a different outcome. In 
each period, a target is designated and a group decision is made.  From period to period, the set 
of alternatives and the set of preferences (the preference types) that exist in the overall group do 
not change.  However, as the target changes, the committee assignments and committee 
jurisdictions change such that the underlying model predicts that the target will be the option 
chosen by the group.  The two research questions  (i) and (ii) above, are answered by a study of 
the success rate with which the target alternative are chosen and by the capacity of the model to 
explain the behaviors exhibited by individuals and by groups in the voting. 
 
The set of fifteen alternatives X = {A,B,….,O} remains fixed throughout the testbed, although as 
will be explained in the appendix, the labels are jumbled throughout the testbed to mask identical 
test situations from subjects.  Preference types are induced.  The set of preference types, T = 
{1,2,…,10}, in the environment are fixed throughout the experiment, although as explained in 
the appendix, the preference types are rotated among subjects to prevent obvious issues of long 
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term strategies that could otherwise link tests.  The preference types are contained in Table 1.  
Each type has a strict preference ordering over the fifteen alternatives as contained in the figure. 
The monetary incentives associated with the preference orderings are in Table 3 and will be 
explained in detail in Appendix 3. The preference types are illustrated in a two dimensional 
spatial configuration in Figure 3. 
 
The fact that the options and preference types are fixed throughout the testbed means that the 
majority rule “preference” or “dominance relation” remains fixed throughout all parts of the 
testbed.  The majority rule preference is contained in Table 2. Of significance is the fact that a 
Condorcet winner exists among all alternatives and preference types. Option A is preferred by a 
majority to any other option. Furthermore, the strict majority rule preference is acyclic in the 
sense that it contains no preference cycles. However, the majority rule preference order is not 
strictly transitive since it can be that x is preferred to y and y to z but x ties with z under majority 
rule given the even number of people. 
 
Table 1 Experimental Preferences – Throughout the experiment, the underlying preferences of 
members over the fifteen options remains the same. The option O is the least preferred option for 
all members and serves as the initial status quo for all periods. 
  
Ordinal Rank of Options 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
M
em
b
er
 T
y
p
e 
1 L G D B J I A E F C N H M K O 
2 L I D G N A B F C J E K H M O 
3 I N D F L A G C B K E H J M O 
4 N F I K C A D H B L G E M J O 
5 K F N C H A I D E B M G L J O 
6 K H C F M A E B N D I J G L O 
7 M H E C K A J B F D G I N L O 
8 M E J H B A C G D K F L I N O 
9 J E M B G A H C D L F I K N O 
10 J G B L E D A M C I H F K N O 
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Table 2 Majority Rule Dominance Relations – The option A is the Condorcet winner of the 
committee as a whole because it is preferred by a majority to all other options. For the remaining 
options, there is a weak Condorcet ordering in that options are dominated only by a subset of 
options (represented via letters) that precede it in the alphabet. 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 
A   6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
B 4   5 5 5 6 6 5 6 6 6 7 6 6 
C 4 5   6 5 5 5 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 
D 4 5 4   5 6 6 5 6 6 6 7 6 6 
E 4 5 5 5   5 5 6 5 6 6 5 7 6 
F 4 4 5 4 5   5 5 6 5 6 6 6 7 
G 4 4 5 4 5 5   5 5 5 6 6 5 6 
H 4 5 4 5 4 5 5   5 5 5 6 6 5 
I 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5   5 6 5 5 7 
J 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5   5 5 5 5 
K 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 5   5 5 6 
L 4 3 4 3 5 4 4 4 5 5 5   5 5 
M 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 5 5 5 5   5 
N 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 3 5 4 5 5   
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Subject Value Schedule – This table conveys each period’s monetary payoffs (in $) for 
all participants. Payoffs were generated by equation 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 = 2.76 –  0.16 × (𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘). 
Ordin
al rank 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
$ 2.50 2.33 2.17 2.00 1.83 1.67 1.50 1.33 1.17 1.00 0.83 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.17 
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Figure 3 Spatial Representation of Preference Profile - In the two dimensional representation 
above, members ( ) prefer options ( ) that are spatially closer to options that are further away. 
The option A is Condorcet winner because a majority (6 out of 10) of members prefers it to any 
other option. The option O (not pictured) is everyone’s least preferred option and the initial 
status quo.  
 
 
The existence of a Condorcet winner among all alternatives plays two background roles. First, it 
is an attractive theory of behavior and in ordinary majority rule settings the Condorcet winner is 
known to serve well as a theory of equilibrium. The ability to design an organization that 
consistently and predictably choose some alternative other than the Condorcet winner is a 
measure of organizational control and the power of the underlying influence model.  Secondly, 
majority rule preference acyclicity provides a measure of organizational influence and control 
since intuition suggests that the process would naturally equilibrate “up” toward the Condorcet 
winner, which is alternative A. 
 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I J 
K 
L 
M 
N 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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With the intuitive theory of dynamics and social preference in mind, the power of the theory can 
be appreciated.  In the course of the testbed, various alternatives other than  the overall 
Condorcet winner, alternative A, will be designated as a target and when so designated will be 
the alternative chosen by the relevant decision center/ subcommittee. 
 
A. Testbed Structure 
The testbed design is outlined in Figure 4. Two separate, identical experiments were conducted. 
Each experiment consisted of ten subjects, ten preference types, and fifteen alternatives.  The 
pattern of preferences for all fifteen alternatives was identical across both experiments.  One 
alternative was designated as the status quo.  It was the least preferred alternative by all 
preference types.  Each experiment consisted of two separate sessions, specified by the 
underlying models, assignments and procedures used to accomplish control: a Condorcet 
Mechanism and a Chairman Mechanism.  Each of the two sessions focused on the ability of the 
mechanism to influence the organization to choose the specified target, which the organization 
was designed to choose.  As will be discussed below, from the point of view of design the 
implementation of the Condorcet Mechanism required more information about individual 
preferences than does the Chairman Mechanism. 
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Figure 4. Testbed Design – The testbed consists of two experiments, each with two sessions. 
Within each session, both subcommittees and then the committee of the whole vote 15 times. 
Those 15 votes are composed of 3 repetitions of 5 configurations (described in Table 5 and 6). 
Subjects with preferences induced by monetary incentives vote following the organization and 
rules imposed for the design. The tests are designed to reveal the influence of the organization 
and the accuracy of the models that predict the influence. In all, 20 subjects made 180 decisions. 
 
 Session 1: Condorcet Mechanism Session 2: Chairman Mechanism 
E
x
p
er
im
en
t 
1
 organization 
configuration 
Subcom. 
1 
Subcom. 2 
Committee 
of the Whole 
Subcom. 1 Subcom. 2 
Committee of 
the Whole 
 
decisions 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 
 45 total decisions 45 total decisions 
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Subcom. 
1 
Subcom. 2 
Committee of 
the Whole 
Subcom. 1 Subcom. 2 
Committee of 
the Whole 
organization 
configuration 
 
decisions 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 15 votes 
 
45 total decisions 45 total decisions 
 
The broad organizational framework was the same for all experiments and all sessions. Two 
subcommittees (Subcommittee 1 and Subcommittee 2) were created consisting of five members 
each. Committee jurisdictions consisted of seven alternatives each and the subcommittees were 
charged with choosing one option from the jurisdiction assigned to the subcommittee. 
Subcommittee choices were transmitted to a committee of the group as a whole, which made the 
final decision from the two options presented to it. This final decision served as the basis for 
payment to all subjects. 
 
Five different group targets were chosen in each of the two sessions (the Condorcet Mechanism 
and the Chairman Mechanism) for each of the two experiments. The core was the behavioral 
model  used to configure subcommittee organizations that would result in the group target as the 
final choice of the committee as a whole. Since the final decision depended on the choices made 
by subcommittees, the selection of a group target implied a selection of a target for each of the 
two subcommittees in addition to the target for the group when acting as a whole. The 
organization was configured such that the subgroup target was an element of the core and each 
subgroup choice contributes to the overall test of the underlying behavioral model.   
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Thus, within a session as defined by the mechanism (Condorcet or Chairman), each of the five 
group targets actually decomposed into three (sub) targets. Tests were replicated three times for 
each of the five group targets producing 15 decisions for each of the three choosing groups 
within a session. That is, a session consisted of three choosing groups (two subcommittees and a 
committee of the whole) so each session produced 45 committee decisions (fifteen by each of the 
two subcommittees and fifteen by the committee as a whole). Given two sessions per experiment 
and two experiments, the total is 180 decisions. 
 
The two sessions are defined in terms of the mechanisms that were applied to control the group 
choices (Condorcet Sessions and Chairman Sessions).  Choice manipulation using the 
equilibrium or Condorcet winner design required information about all preferences.  In the 
Condorcet sessions, the assignment of types and the alternatives allocated as the jurisdiction 
were chosen such that the sub-target for each subcommittee existed as a Condorcet winner. Each 
group target was accompanied by changes in committee preference profiles and alternatives such 
that a Condorcet winner existed and was predicted as the choice. Of course, the Condorcet 
winner is the core if it exists, but it is not always possible, or might be difficult to assign 
preference types and alternatives such that the sub-goal would be a Condorcet winner. Thus, the 
Condorcet sessions are a solid but limited test from the point of view of a testbed of the 
manipulation power of the mechanism. 
 
From an institutional design and “committee karate” perspective, the Chairman mechanism has 
advantages over the Condorcet mechanism because under Chairman mechanism, the core always 
exists and finding an element of the core requires only information about the most preferred 
option of the chairman as opposed to the whole preference ordering. However, it might not be 
possible to configure the institutions such that the core is exactly the target alternative.  
 
In the Chairman mechanism sessions, the organizational configuration and the use of the closed 
rule procedures in particular, gave the Chairman special powers, interpreted as blocking powers 
in the model. That is, the chairman can be modeled as veto player, or, “blocking coalition” who 
becomes decisive only if joined by a majority.  Possible design limitations are created by two 
features.  First, the chairman’s optimum alternative is always in the core but it could be the case 
that no possible committee member has the target alternative as an optimum.. Second, other 
alternatives can also be in the core. If a Condorcet winner exists, it is also in the core as can be 
22 
 
alternatives that are “between” the chairman’s optimum and the Condorcet winner. As a result, in 
the Chairman sessions, the core always existed but sometimes contained multiple alternatives 
that include the chairman’s optimal, a Condorcet winner and possibly additional alternatives.  
 
The testbed asks whether the chosen elements will be in the core and if so, which elements. The 
Chairman sessions focus directly on the empirical issues by choosing targets such that the target 
was always an element of the core. On some occasions, the chairman’s most preferred was the 
unique alternative of the core and on others was part of a multi-element core. Defining the target 
to be the most preferred alternative of some member of the subcommittee and changing the 
identity of the chairman to align the target with the design created a test of the ability of the 
organization configuration to control the alternative chosen by the subcommittee.  
 
For the Chairman sessions, the target alternative was changed across sessions while the 
committee jurisdictions and preference types remained unchanged in the two subcommittees. 
The configuration for Subcommittee 1 had no Condorcet winner and the core was sometimes a 
unique alternative, the chairman’s optimal. By contrast, alternative A, the overall Condorcet 
winner, was always available for Subcommittee 2 and was always in the core for that 
subcommittee. This pattern of configurations provides a study of conditions when the Condorcet 
winner does not exist and the core is unique, when the Condorcet winner does not exist and the 
core is not unique and when the Condorcet winner does exist and the core contains the Condorcet 
winner together with other alternatives. Thus, the power of the Chairman mechanism and the 
core is tested under a variety of circumstances and the possibility that the core favors some 
elements over others, e.g. chairman’s most preferred versus Condorcet winner, can be studied. 
 
The Condorcet mechanism is structured such that the majority rule relation in each committee 
contains no majority rule cycles. The weak majority rule relation is transitive but due to ties the 
strict majority rule relation is not. Classical voting theory with the open rule suggests that in each 
committee an application of a simple version of Roberts Rules will lead to a choice of the 
Condorcet winner. Each subcommittee will choose the option the designer wants and the runoff 
vote between subcommittee choices will result in the desired outcome. 
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B. Committee Procedures 
Initially, the default option, option O is designated as the motion on the floor. It is the least 
preferred option for all members. The motion on the floor is then amended through an 
amendment process that occurs in four stages. 
 
Stage 1: Motions - During this 10 second stage, members may do one of the following: nothing; 
propose an amendment to the motion on the floor; or propose that the subcommittee recommend 
the current motion on the floor. Once the timer expires, a proposal will be chosen at random for 
further consideration as an alternative to the motion on the floor. 
 
Stage 2: Seconds to Motions- During this 5 second stage the floor is open for a second to the 
proposed option.  
Under the Condorcet mechanism, any member, except the proposer, may second the 
recognized proposal and bring it to a vote. If no one seconds the proposal, the process 
returns to the previous stage.   
Under the Chairman mechanism, only the chairman of the committee has the power to 
second a motion. Thus, the chairman has blocking power in the sense that the Chairman 
is in all winning coalitions. However, the chairman alone is not a winning coalition. 
Stage 3: Majority Rule- Any motion that passes by a majority of the committee members’ votes, 
will pass.  Voting was required. 
Stage 4: Motions to end- Any member can propose a motion to end.  
 
C. Preference Inducement 
Traditional methods of using money to induce and control preferences were used. The control for 
long term strategies and interdependence of strategies among centers required rotations of the 
preference types and permutation of the alternative names/labels. These are reviewed in 
appendix 3.  
 
Section 7. Model Predictions   
As outlined in Section 5, the testbed procedures reflect the underlying normative goals and 
theory of the organizational decisions.  Tables 4. 5, and 6 contain the targets, behavioral 
predictions, and the results. The testbed environment has four features that challenge the design. 
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(1) There is a large number of feasible options (15), so an ability to predict a specific 
option must overcome any inherent randomness that might be reasonably expected to 
produce any outcome with some probability;   
(2)  The experiments are conducted in an environment in which the preferences of the 
entire collective have a Condorcet winner, which serves as a natural comparison. That is, 
if the agents were to engage in a majority rule process following Roberts Rules with open 
proposals and voting, the group deliberations would converge to an equilibrium - the 
Condorcet winner, which is alternative A. The Condorcet winner from among all 
alternatives is a natural outcome against which successful influence can be compared; 
(3) The design depends on the reliability of subcommittee processes. If one of the 
subcommittees deviates, then the whole system can fail to hit the target; and  
(4) The core often has multiple elements, so theory predicts that the target option will not 
be chosen with certainty.  
Table 5 contains the predictions of committee decisions when operating under the Condorcet 
mechanism for both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Each experiment lasted for fifteen periods 
(five configurations repeated three times) and the sessions that existed in a given period were the 
same in both experiments. Each period consisted of three committee decisions: Subcommittee 1, 
Subcommittee 2, and the Overall Committee consisting of the members of both subcommittees. 
The core and the target alternative were the same for both experiments for a given committee and 
a given period as shown in Table 5. Under the Condorcet mechanism, the core and the target are 
always the same alternative. This is because in the Condorcet mechanism, the core is a single 
element and the flexibility of the design allowed a configuration of the parameters such that the 
core and the target coincided. Thus, the normative target was always the predicted outcome for 
the Condorcet sessions. 
 
Table 6 contains the predictions of committee decisions and the core of the underlying social 
choice model when operating under Chairman mechanism for both experiment 1 and experiment 
2. Similar to the Condorcet sessions, each of the Chairman sessions lasted for fifteen periods 
(five configurations repeated three times)and the sessions that existed in a given period were the 
same in both experiments. Again, each period consisted of three committee decisions: 
Subcommittee 1, Subcommittee 2, and the Committee as a Whole consisting of the members of 
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both subcommittees. The core and the target alternative were the same for both experiments for a 
given committee and a given period as shown in the table. 
Table 4 Dynamics of Committee Process – This table accompanies Figure 5. These dynamics 
follow from two assumptions: (i) members follow the myopic strategy of motioning for their most 
preferred option that hasn’t yet been compared to the current status quo, and (ii) members vote for 
their more preferred option in any binary vote. Members only vote to end if all more preferred 
options have already been compared to the current status quo. 
 
Status 
Quo 
Motions Motion 
Recognized 
Voting 
# 1 3 5 7 9 1 3 5 7 9 
1 O L I K M J K K K K K K 
2 K L I K M J L L L K K L 
3 L L I N M J J L L L J J 
4 L L I N M J M L L M M M 
5 M J I K M J K M K K M M 
6 M J I N M J M x x x M x 
7 M J I N M J J J J M M J 
8 J L I K H J I J I I J J 
9 J L N K H J H J J H H J 
10 J L N K K J K J J K K J 
11 J L I N J J J x x x J J 
12 J L I N J J L L L J J J 
13 J J I N J J J J x x J J 
 
Table 5 Experimental Configurations for Condorcet Session– For each configuration, a target 
option is selected and an assignment of members and options to subcommittees is determined 
such that the core of each subcommittee contains the target. In the Condorcet session, the core is 
unique, so the target and core are equivalent. Within each subcommittee, there is a strict 
Condorcet ordering among the options (there are no cycles or indifference among the options). 
The options are presented in the sequence of the strict Condorcet ordering. 
 
Condorcet Session 
  
Subcommittee 1 Subcommittee 2 
 
# 
Targe
t Core 
Members 
Options 
Targe
t Core 
Members 
Options 
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
1 B B 
3, 4, 7, 8, 9 
BDFIKNL G G 
1, 2, 5, 6, 
10 
GACJEH
M 
2 D D 
1, 2, 3, 5, 9 
DGAEKH
M C C 
4, 6, 7, 8, 
10 CJBFINL 
3 F F 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 FBNDJGL I I 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 IAECHMK 
4 L L 1, 2, 4, 5, 10 LDCJEKM H H 3, 6, 7, 8, 9 HABFGIN 
5 K K 1, 5, 6, 7, 10 KABDGIL N N 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 NFCEJHM 
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Table 6 Experimental Configurations for Chairman Session – For each configuration, a target option 
is selected and an assignment of members and options to subcommittees is determined such that the 
core of each subcommittee contains the target. In the Chairman session, the assignment of members 
and options to subcommittees remains the same throughout all configurations: (i) all odd-numbered 
members (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) and options H – N are assigned to Subcommittee 1, and all even-numbered 
members (2, 4, 6, 8, 10) and options A – G are assigned to Subcommittee 2. The only change 
between configurations is the identity of the chairman. Note that the core is not always unique and 
that within Subcommittee 2, the option A is preferred by a majority to all other options (but is never 
the chairman’s favorite). The target is always the most preferred alternative of the chairman for that 
subcommittee. The options are presented in the sequence of the chairman’s preferences 
 
Chairman Session 
  
Subcommittee 1 (Odd Members) Subcommittee 2 (Even Members) 
 
# Target Core Chairman Options Target Core Chairman Options 
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
1 L L 1 LJINHMK D D, A 2 DGABFCE 
2 I I 3 INLKHJM F F, C, A 4 FCADBGE 
3 K K 5 KNHIMLJ C C, A 6 CFAEBDG 
4 M M, H 7 MHKJINL E E, B, A 8 EBACGDF 
5 J J, H 9 JMHLIKN G G, B, A 10 GBEDACF 
 
For the Chairman sessions, the alternative most preferred by the chairman is always an element 
of the core but a Condorcet winner is also an element of the core. Depending on the majority rule 
relation and the preference of the chairman, other alternatives can also be elements of the core.  
Thus, the core need not be unique as is illustrated in Table 6. Shown there for all periods and all 
committees are all elements of the core with the most preferred of the chairman shown at the left 
and side of the list and the Condorcet winner listed on the right hand side. The core can be a 
single alternative as it is in periods 1, 2, and 3 of Subcommittee 1 but in all other cases the core 
contains more than one element.  
 
The underlying conditions of the testbed together with the tools available for influencing the 
decisions placed limitations on the design. In particular, on occasion, without substantial 
reconstruction of committee assignments and jurisdictions, it was difficult to construct a 
configuration of the parameters such that the core was the single alternative designated as the 
target.  However, the target is always a subset of the core. Table 6 lists both the target for each 
period and the core. 
 
Given institutional constraints, it may not be possible to design a process that always results in a 
choice of the target alternative. Nonetheless, the resulting design inaccuracy can be readily 
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anticipated and measured. In particular, as the core becomes larger, it becomes less likely that the 
target will be selected. 
 
Specifically, consider the case of two subcommittees and let Ci, be the core of subcommittee i 
and let x be the target alternative, which is one of the alternatives considered by Subcommittee 1. 
The measure assumes that the core occurs with certainty.  Let Y be the alternatives considered by 
Subcommittee 2 that are in C2 and also that x dominates in a majority rule sense and let yY 
Pr(y| C2 ) be the sum over the relevant events.  Under those assumptions the theoretical accuracy 
is measured by 
 design accuracy = [Pr(x|C1)Pr(C1)][ yY Pr(y| C2 )Pr(C2)]. 
Given that the models predicting the core outcomes occur without error, the probabilities Pr(C1) 
and Pr(C2) are both 1 for purposes of this measurement. For the uniform distribution case where 
ties are ignored, the formula simplifies to design accuracy = (1/n)(k/m) where: n is the number of 
elements in the core of Subcommittee 1 (which has our preferred option x); m is the number of 
elements in the core of Subcommittee 2; k is the number of elements in the core of 
Subcommittee 2 that are dominated by x. 
Note that if one of the subcommittees fails to produce the target alternative, then the overall 
target may be missed. Given our setup, even if Subcommittee 1 fails, as long as Subcommittee 2 
succeeds, then the choice of the overall committee will be on target. This is because every option 
considered by Subcommittee 2 is preferred by a majority to every option considered by 
Subcommittee 1. Hence, the rate at which the overall committee is predicted to reach the target 
alternative is 33% in the Chairman sessions with three elements in the core and 50% when there 
are two elements in the core. There are two instances of two element cores and three of three 
element cores, so the hit rate is predicted to be 40% or a miss rate of 60%. 
 
The results of the testbed and the outcomes of all experiments will be discussed in Section 8.  
The discussion includes design success and the accuracy of the underlying behavioral model, 
together with insights about the dynamics that became understood only after studying the 
committee behaviors. 
Section 8. Experimental Procedures  
Subjects were students at the California Institute of Technology and were recruited for 2-hour 
sessions through laboratory subject databases and dormitory announcements. All subjects were 
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inexperienced (participated only once). As a group, they had no knowledge of the complexities 
of social choice (the possibility of cycles, the existence of a core, etc.).  
 
Both experiments were conducted via computer terminals in the Caltech Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics and Political Science. Talking was not permitted during the experiment 
and partitions existed that prevented clear views of other subjects. Instructions (Appendix 1) 
were printed, distributed, and read to all subjects. All values were stated in experimental 
currency units.  Individual subject exchange rates differed across subjects but remained the same 
for a given subject throughout the experiment and were private information. Average earnings 
were $51 for the session ($1.70 average per decision). 
 
Experiments were programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
Screenshots of the program are shown in Appendix 2. As stated in the instructions, options 
appear on the subjects screen from most preferred on the left, to the least preferred on the right. 
Subjects were also able to see a history of all past recognized motions and votes. 
 
Section 9. Results 
Two classes of results are outlined. Section A addresses the reliability of the organization to 
manipulate the outcome as intended.  Section B is focused on the dynamic processes at work. 
Three facts create a challenge for performance. First, the group had an overall Condorcet winner.  
It is the core given the majority rule dominance relation and is a natural equilibrium should the 
entire group be governed by majority rule without the subcommittees and the subcommittee 
procedures. Any successful design needs to overcome that tendency. Secondly, success of the 
design is defined by a single, desired outcome.  Performance is measured as either 0 or 1. 
Furthermore, there are many alternatives in the sense that if the outcomes are random from 
among the alternatives then the probability that any one alternative would result is small, 1/15.  
So, any underlying randomness works against the design. Third, the process design consists of 
several separate processes and if one of those processes fails to function  the performance will 
not be according to design.  
 
The outcomes of experiments are reported in Tables 7 and 8. Before reviewing outcomes, an 
example of the dynamics of a single committee process might be useful.  The entire process for 
one period is contained in Figure 5. The options are displayed in a two dimensional 
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representation in a manner that maintains the consistency of a quadratic loss function in the sense 
that if the point of maximum is known for an individual then the preference between options is 
captured by the distance from the individual’s location. Table 4 contains the details of the 
proposals and votes of the decision represented in Figure 5. The first proposal to be considered is 
for option K, which receives a majority to become the new motion on the floor. Option L is 
proposed and passes. A motion to move to J fails and then alternative M passes. A motion to 
change the motion on the floor from M to K fails but a motion to move to J passes. With J as the 
motion on the floor several motions for alternatives I,H,K fail, as does a motion to end debate 
and choose J. A motion to move to L fails and a motion to end and accept J wins. The final 
committee choice is J. 
Figure 5 Dynamics of Committee Process – In the two dimensional representation above, members (
) prefer options ( ) that are spatially closer to options that are further away. The dominance 
relations (≺) show which options are preferred by both the chairman (here, member 9) and majority 
rule. Note that there are two elements in the core (H and J are both undominated), so the dynamics of 
the committee process influence the resulting decision.   The motions and votes from the figure are 
reported in Table 4. Initially, the status quo is O. The first movement (by unanimous vote) is to K 
(1)
, 
which is recognized randomly from among the 5 motions (one from each member). From K, it 
moves to L 
(2)
, and then fails to move to J 
(3) 
because the majority prefers L to J. It proceeds to move 
to M 
(4)
, fails to move to K 
(5)
, fails to end at M 
(6)
, moves to J 
(7)
, fails to move to I 
(8)
, H 
(9)
, and K 
(10)
, fails to end at J 
(11)
, fails to move to L 
(12)
 and finally succeeds to end at J 
(13)
. 
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Table 7 Results for Condorcet Session – The results are listed in the “Outcomes” columns. The 
core was unique in every configuration, so the expected accuracy is 100% (30/30). The results 
closely match this prediction, with an accuracy of 90% for Subcommittee 1, 97% for 
Subcommittee 2, and 90% for the overall committee 
  
Condorcet Session 
  
Subcommittee 1 Subcommittee 2 Overall Committee 
 # Target Core Outcomes Target Core Outcomes Target Core Outcomes 
E
x
p
er
im
en
t 
1
 
1 B B B B B G G G G G B B B B B 
2 D D A D D C C C C C C C A C C 
3 F F F F N I I I I I F F F F I 
4 L L L L D H H H H H H H H H D 
5 K K K K K N N N N N K K K K K 
E
x
p
er
im
en
t 
2
 
1 B B B B B G G G G G B B B B B 
2 D D D D D C C C C C C C C C C 
3 F F F F F I I M I I F F F F F 
4 L L L L L H H H H H H H H H H 
5 K K K K K N N N N N K K K K K 
  
Expected (30/30) Expected (30/30) Expected (30/30) 
  
Experimental (27/30) Experimental (29/30) Experimental (27/30) 
 
Table 8 Results for Chairman Session - The results are listed in the “Outcomes” columns. The 
core was not unique in every configuration, so the expected accuracy is not necessarily 100%. 
Instead, if we assume that each element of the core is equally likely to be chosen, then when 
there are two elements, the expected accuracy is 50% and when there are three elements the 
expected accuracy is 33%. Across configurations, we get an average expected accuracy of 80% 
(24/30) for Subcommittee 1 and 40% (12/30) for Subcommittee 2. The target for the overall 
committee is always the target of Subcommittee 2, so we also have a 40% (12/30) average 
expected accuracy for the overall committee.    
  
Chairman Session 
  
Subcommittee 1 Subcommittee 2 Overall Committee 
 # Target Core Outcomes Target Core Outcomes Target Core Outcomes 
E
x
p
er
im
en
t 
1
 
1 L L L J L D D, A A D A D D, A A D A 
2 I I I I I F F, C, A C A C F F, C, A C A C 
3 K K K H K C C, A C A C C C, A C A C 
4 M M, H K H M E E, B, A A B A E E, B, A A B A 
5 J J, H J J J G G, B, A B B G G G, B, A B B G 
E
x
p
er
im
en
t 
2
 
1 L L L I L D D, A B A D D D, A B A D 
2 I I I I N F F, C, A C C F F F, C, A C C F 
3 K K K H K C C, A C C C C C, A C C C 
4 M M, H H M H E E, B, A A E A E E, B, A A E A 
5 J J, H J J M G G, B, A G G B G G, B, A J J B 
  
Expected (24/30) Expected (12/30) Expected (12/30) 
  
Experimental (20/30) Experimental (12/30) Experimental (10/30) 
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A. The Mechanism is Successful.  
As shown in Tables 7 and 8, the decision process performed substantially as it was designed to 
perform. Result 1 states that the performance of the system conformed to the design, but was 
imperfect. Result 2 explains that those imperfections were not due to a lack of reliability in the 
underlying theory, but instead a consequence of having multiple elements in the core. 
 
RESULT 1: The organization systematically influenced the group choices to choose the target 
option. The Condorcet sessions were the most successful, followed by the Chairman sessions. 
 
Support.  The target alternative was chosen substantially more frequently than can be explained 
as random, which would have the target being chosen on the order of 6% of the trials. For 
subcommittees in the Condorcet sessions, 56 of the 60 trials (93%) resulted in a choice of the 
target. As mentioned above, the target success of the committee as a whole is sensitive to the 
target success of the separate committee decisions that constitute the choice of the committee as 
a whole.  For the committee as a whole, with subcommittees operating in Condorcet sessions, 27 
of the 30 trials (90%) resulted in a choice of the target. For subcommittees operating in the 
Chairman sessions, 32 of 60 trials (53%) resulted in a choice of the target. For the committee as a 
whole, with subcommittees operating in Chairman sessions, 10 of the 30 trials (33%) resulted in 
a choice of the target, which is on the order of the 40% hit rate predicted. 
 
Result 1 says that the overall group choice was influenced by the organization as predicted.  
Result 2 leads to a better understanding of the reliability of the tools. The question posed is 
focused on accuracy of the core. Given the alternatives available to a committee how well are the 
committee choices predicted by the core (as opposed to the target). The subcommittees have all 
of the assigned alternatives available but the committee as a whole has only the alternatives 
available that happened to filter through the subcommittees. In addition, the core has multiple 
alternatives. The result says that given the condition for the application of the theory, it does very 
well as a predictive tool.  
 
RESULT 2: The system outcomes tended to be in the core of the dominance relation among the 
options available to the appropriate committee. When the core contained multiple elements, the 
winning alternative was not biased toward some particular alternative in the core such as the 
Chairman’s optimum or the Condorcet winner. The tendency of the choice to include any 
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element of the core, as opposed to just the target, resulted in proportionate degradation of design 
accuracy. 
 
Support. The choices tended to be the alternatives in the core. In the Condorcet sessions, the core 
(the Condorcet winner) was a single element and in those experiments, 56 of 60 subcommittee 
trials (93%) resulted with the only alternative in the core. Thus, under the Condorcet mechanism, 
the alternative targeted as the subcommittee choice was the choice. In the chairman sessions, 52 
of 60 trials resulted with an alternative in the core. Of those 52 trials, 32 were the chairman’s 
optimum (i.e. the target), 9 were the Condorcet winner, and the remaining 11 were additional 
elements in a multi-element core. These results are reported in Table 7 and Table 8 respectively. 
Across both sessions, all binary decisions made by the committee of the whole were the core (the 
majority preferred option) of the two alternatives. 
 
While the chosen alternatives were in the core the design accuracy was less than perfect because 
the core often contained elements in addition to the target alternative. Of the eighteen cases for 
which the core had one alternative (the target), 13 of the eighteen committee decisions were in 
the core (.72).  When the core had two alternatives, there were 24 committee decisions of which 
21 (.875) were in the core and 14 of 28 were the target (.583). When the core had three 
alternatives, there were 18 committee decisions of which 18 (1.0) were in the core and 5 (.277) 
were the target. The core was an accurate predictor of the outcome and among the elements of 
the core the target was chosen with about the same probability as were other elements of the 
core.  Of course, whether this feature of proportionality is a general property or not requires 
additional theory and experiments. 
 
The model accuracy of the committee when voting as a whole reflects the fact that 
subcommittees must chose the target alternative in order for the committee as a whole to choose 
the target. In the Condorcet sessions, the target alternative was the choice for 27 out of the 30 
committee of the whole choices (.90). In the chairman sessions, the committee as a whole chose 
the target alternative 10 out of the 30 decisions (.333), which is in line with the special case 
accuracy prediction of .333. 
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Section B. Properties of Dynamics 
The success of the core as a behavioral model leads to questions about the micro principles of 
decision and the properties of the dynamics. What types of voting and sequences of motions lead 
to the core? The results below suggest that non-strategic (myopic) models of behavior dictate the 
dynamics. In particular, Result 3 shows that the next step in a dynamic path of motions is 
dictated by the dominance relation.  Result 4 shows that the myopic behavior stems from both 
the decisions to propose motions and from the voting behavior. If strategic voting was 
predominant, one might deviations from dominance.  
 
RESULT 3:  The dynamic movement of the motion on the floor follows the path of the 
dominance relation. That is, a motion to move the alternative on the floor to a different 
alternative succeeds if the proposed change is to a dominating alternative and the motion fails if 
the destination is not a dominating alternative. 
  
Support.  Across all experiments, a total of 301 motions were made to change the motion on the 
floor to some other alternative. Of the 301 motions, 85 motions proposed movements to an 
alternative dominated by the motion on the floor. All 85 failed resulting in 216 movements of the 
motion on the floor. Of the 216 movements, 211 (98%) followed the dominance relation. The 5 
movements that did not follow the dominance relation are discussed as errors in Result 5. 
 
RESULT 4: Individual proposals and individual voting tend to be sincere (preference revealing). 
 
Support.  The sincere nature of proposals is supported by the fact that nearly every motion 
proposed is sincere in the sense that the proposed alternative is preferred to the motion on the 
floor by the proposer: 98.5% of motions (3928 of 3988) are for an option preferred by the 
proposer or to end deliberations. Moreover, proposed motions follow a predictable pattern: 62% 
directly follow the strategy of proposing their most preferred option not yet considered against 
the current motion on the floor. An additional 13% propose their most preferred option despite 
previous consideration. Another 11% propose their most preferred not yet rejected (a strategy 
that is rational in an environment without cycles). Thus, over 86% of motions are part of a 
myopic “hill climbing” (“sincere”) strategy. Of the 60 insincere motions, 52 were made after a 
failed attempt to end with the individual’s preferred option. This instance of insincerity can be 
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interpreted as strategy to compromise on a slightly less preferred option rather than endure 
protracted debate that might end with an even less preferred option. 
 
The voting on motions proposed also follows a pattern of sincere, preference revealing similar to 
proposals. Nearly all votes are sincere: 94.5% of votes (1422 of 1505) are cast for the preferred 
option and only 83 were not. 
 
Observation 1: (evidence of dynamic strategies).  Instances of insincere voting appear only under 
special circumstances. Of the 83 insincere votes, 60 are cast for O – the initial motion on the 
floor, which is everyone’s least preferred option. The observation is that these votes for O may 
reflect a dynamic strategy to retain a “bad” option that has no chance of being chosen, while 
attempting to influence a motion in the preferred direction. Regardless, these individual votes 
were never effective in blocking an amendment.  
 
Given the possibility of strategic behavior, it is useful to study the detail of instances in which 
the core model was inaccurate. The next result is that these exceptions to  model predictions do 
not contain evidence that suggests they resulted from strategies more sophisticated than sincere 
voting. 
 
RESULT 5.  The core failed to contain the group choice in 11 of 180 committee decisions. These 
inaccuracies of the model reveal no systemic departure from the basic principles of sincere 
voting behavior that support the use of the core as a behavioral model. 
 
Support.  (i) In 8 of the 11 model errors, the error reflects a premature termination in the sense 
that an agent voted to end without proposing a preferred alternative that had not been defeated by 
the motion on the floor. (ii) In the remaining 3 errors, 1 was due to insincere voting and 2 were 
due to the chairman seconding motions that were for a less preferred option. 
 
The patterns of subcommittee (centers) behavior suggest that overall design created behavior 
consistent with the Independence of Infeasible Alternatives axiom.  The setting of subcommittee 
decisions within the larger organization had no effect on subcommittee behavior. That is, 
information and incentives remained local. 
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Observation 2.  Decision Centers acted with autonomy.  
 
Support.  The design produced no direct test of the axiom since preferences and committee 
jurisdictions systematically changed throughout the testbed. A direct test would require the 
jurisdiction and preferences in one center to remain constant while the changed in the other 
center. However, Results 4 and Result 5 amount to restatements of the axiom at the individual 
level.  Individual decisions tended to be sincere. The decisions reflected only the immediate, 
local environment. The exceptions to sincere voting were few and exhibited no relationship with 
the preferences or options under consideration by the members of other centers.  
 
The combined results indicate that the design did what it was supposed to do and did it according 
to the principles that lead to the design in the first place. Both Result 1 and Result 2 report 
outcomes that were substantially predicted by the model. Indeed, the accuracy is accurately 
predicted by the model. The success of the design cannot be attributed to accident or 
randomness. The reliability of the basic principles are supported by a study of the dynamics 
(Result 3) and individual behavior (Result 4). Behavior inconsistent with the model can be traced 
to specific errors of the model (Result 5) as opposed to some broad failure of the principles. 
Observation 2 connects the behavior with the most fundamental of the organizational properties 
that enable the success of the design. 
 
The final observation addresses participant perceptions of bias. Is the organization perceived as 
biased in the sense that participants realize the purpose implicit in the organizational design and 
reject the organization as a result? A questionnaire distributed after the experiment asked the 
questions directly. It appears that the participants did not perceive that the group as a whole was 
manipulated by the organizational design and did not focus on the overall process as being 
unfair.   
 
Observation 3.  Participants did not regard the process as “unfair”. Participants did not perceive 
the overall process as biased and to the extent that bias was perceived, it was confined to the 
detailed operations of a committee. 
 
Support.  Manipulation occurred equally in Condorcet and Chairman sessions, yet perceptions of 
fairness were narrowly focused on whether or not one person was perceived as having an 
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advantage. Among the subjects 80% thought that the results in Condorcet sessions accurately 
reflected preferences and 55% thought that the Condorcet mechanism was fair. By contrast, 25 % 
of the subjects thought that the decisions in the Chairman experiments “accurately reflected 
preferences” and 15% thought that the decisions in the Chairman experiments were “fair”.  
 
From the perspective of implementation it appears as though the groups were unaware of the 
manipulation that took place. Thus, the operation of Committee Karate can proceed through the 
implementation of a process that appears fair but is not. 
 
Section 10.  Summary of Conclusions  
We studied groups of ten people, with fixed and conflicting preferences over fifteen alternatives.  
The environment contained neither money nor private goods. The research task was to design a 
system, a “mechanism”, to manipulate the group to choose an alternative we wanted as opposed 
to the alternative that might otherwise be chosen. The tools are derived from axiomatic social 
choice theory and cooperative game theory.  Experimental  methodology for testing mechanism 
designs suggests two key questions concerning the connection between observed performance 
and the principles used in the design. (i) did the system do what it was supposed to do – proof of 
principle? (ii) did it do what it did for understandable (theoretical) reasons – design consistency? 
 
The group as a whole always had a majority preferred alternative. The research task was to 
develop procedures that would cause them to choose various alternatives (the target alternatives) 
that were ranked low in a (weak) majority rule order. Thus, the target alternatives were 
alternatives that one would expect would not be chosen by the group if left to its own. Five target 
alternatives were chosen. Two different sets of preferences were induced.  For each target three 
separate experimental trials were performed.  The testing is actually much more extensive since, 
as will be reviewed below, each trial consisted of three different committees, two subcommittees, 
and the committee as a whole. 
 
The results demonstrate overwhelming support for the design success. The target alternative 
typically emerged thus establishing proof of principle.  The cases where the target did not 
emerge as the choice were due to multiple equilibria and were also predicted by the model.  
Thus, design consistency is evident in the data. Furthermore, post experiment questionnaires 
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suggested that the committee members regarded the process as fair and did not perceive to have 
been manipulated. In every respect, the committee karate seems to have worked. 
 
What have we learned that a committee karate practitioner might try? The theory and data have 
not produced an optimal way to manipulate but they do suggest a simple rule of thumb 
algorithm. Agenda theory suggests that the manipulation power is enhanced by a type of “divide 
and conquer” strategy that itself relies on limited coordination and communication within the 
group. (1) Determine a target alternative, the alternative the practitioner wants chosen. (2) 
Partition options and choose an option from each of the two sets such that one of the two chosen 
options is the target alternative and the second of the two options is one that the target option will 
beat in a majority vote of the committee as a whole (or by the committee that will be assigned to 
make a final resolution of choices). (3) Key steps are the allocation of people to subcommittees, 
the appointment of a committee chairman and the designation of rules for the subcommittee 
decision process. The objective of the steps is that the two alternatives be the respective 
committee choices.  Use information about individual preferences to appoint committee 
members such that for each group the desired alternative is the core of the respective voting 
group. If the core does not exist then appoint chairpersons such that the alternative the designer 
wants to be the winner of subcommittee voting is the alternative most preferred by the 
chairperson. Give the chairperson blocking power, such as the unique power of a second or a 
power that prevents votes on certain proposals.  This arrangement assures that the target 
alternative will be in the core of the implied game representation of the subcommittee decision 
process. (4) Make sure that the subcommittees are autonomous and that there is no cooperative 
voting across subcommittees and no side payments within a subcommittee. (5) Pass the 
subcommittee choices back to the group as a whole or designate a special committee to make the 
final, runoff decision. Since the two options emerging from subcommittee votes were 
strategically chosen such that the non-target alternative would lose in a runoff, the choice of the 
group as a whole will be the target alternative.  
 
Manipulation appears in many forms and descriptions.  Here, manipulation was used as a 
framework for exploring key aspects of how organizations work within a formal structure. Thus, 
while the idea of committee karate or manipulation carries with it a tone of Machiavellianism or 
antisocial theory, the opposite can be the case. On such matters, the science is morally neutral. 
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The theories can be used for manipulation as well as for tools for protection against 
manipulation, hidden agendas, and poorly designed decision processes. This paper simply 
illustrates that cooperative game theory and axiomatic social choice theory can be added to the 
design toolbox. 
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Appendix 1:  Software, Procedures and Instructions 
 
A.  An outline of committee procedures 
 
A history of past proposals and their results is maintained for all committee members to review 
as deliberations take place. 
 
Motion on the floor: The process starts with the default option as the motion on the floor. 
 
Recognition: When stage opens participants have 10 seconds to choose an option and seek 
recognition. A random selection is made from those who seek recognition. 
 
Proposed Amendments: The participants recognized submit their selected alternative as an 
amendment to the motion on the floor. If the proposal is seconded it is presented for a vote. The 
proposed amendment is highlighted for all to see and understand that it is proposed. 
Seconds to proposed amendments: Under the Condorcet mechanism, seconding of the motion 
can be done by any committee member other than the member that made the motion.  Under the 
Chairman mechanism, only the chairman can second motions. The floor remains open for 5 
seconds or until seconded.  If there is no second, the proposed motion fails. The previous motion 
on the floor remains as the motion on the floor. If the proposed amendment is not seconded, the 
system returns to the Recognition Stage.  
Voting: If the amendment is seconded, the screen changes color (orange) to indicate that a vote is 
to take place between the proposed amendment and the motion on the floor. Voting is open until 
all have voted. Do you want x to become the new motion on the floor and replace y? 
If the amendment fails the original motion on the floor remains.  If the amendment passes it 
becomes the new motion on the floor.  The system returns to the Recognition Stage. 
Ending debate: During the recognition stage, a motion to end debate can be offered.  If 
recognized, it must also receive a second, which can be done by anyone other than the person 
making the motion. If the motion to end debate is seconded then the screen asks “We now vote 
on the motion on the floor. Would you like to end the amendment process and accept the motion 
on the floor as the committee decision?” Subjects must choose yes or no. Pass is determined by 
majority. If no, the system returns to the Recognition Stage. 
B.  Instructions 
 
Purpose and Payoffs 
You will participate in an experiment on group decision 
making. You will be a member of a committee that must 
choose one letter from a set of letters. Only one of the letters 
will be chosen and the payment you receive for participation 
depends entirely upon which letter it is. People’s preferences 
for the letters may differ, so the letters you prefer may not be 
preferred by others. 
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Preferences 
On your screen, the letters are ordered from your most preferred to your least preferred.  
 
Here, L is your most preferred letter, I is your second most preferred letter, and so on. Below 
each letter is your payoff in experimental currency should that letter be chosen as the 
committee’s decision. Thus, if L is chosen as the committee’s decision, you will get 400 in 
experimental currency; if K is chosen, you will get 150. Your exchange rate from experimental 
currency to dollars is located in the top left. This member’s exchange rate is 100, so a payoff of 
400 would amount to $4.  
Other members may differ in their orderings, payoffs, and exchange rates. For example: 
 
Her exchange rate is 25 and her most preferred alternative K has a payoff of 75, which is worth 
$3. 
Procedure 
In order for the committee to choose a letter, it must follow some rules of order. Initially, 
- The committee is split into subcommittees  
- Each subcommittee is assigned a subset of the letters from which they must choose a 
recommendation. All recommendations go to a final committee that chooses among the 
recommendations as the committee’s decision via majority rule.  
- It is this final decision on which your payoff depends, not the subcommittee’s decision. 
- One letter O is designated as the initial “motion on the floor” (which can be considered 
the subcommittee’s tentative decision).  
The subset of letters from which your subcommittee can choose is depicted via outline. 
Specifically, the letters your subcommittee can choose between in the example above are L, I, B, 
E, A, F, K and O. The motion on the floor is O and the subcommittee will have an opportunity to 
change the motion on the floor through an amendment process. 
Amendment Process 
Initially, the floor is open for proposals and all members may propose an amendment to the 
motion on the floor by selecting an alternative letter. This proposal stage will occur multiple 
times. After the timer expires, only one proposed amendment will be chosen for further 
consideration. So if multiple people submit a proposal that lowers the chance that your proposal 
is considered by the subcommittee at this stage. But suppose that you are the only person 
submitting a proposal – then your proposal will definitely be considered. During the seconding 
stage, the proposed letter will be bolded and all other letters deemphasized. If you were the 
proposer, the box is blue. Otherwise, it will simply be bolded. Anyone except the proposer may 
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second the proposal. If not seconded within the time limit, the process returns to the proposal 
stage. If seconded, all members must choose whether or not the proposed amendment should 
become the motion on the floor. If not, the existing motion on the floor remains. 
History  
Throughout the period, a history of all proposals made and their votes is displayed in the bottom 
left. 
 
As other members vote, their votes are displayed in real time. After each vote on a proposed 
alternative, the process returns to the proposal stage. In the example above, the majority of 
members voted for the proposed amendment B over the initial motion on the floor B, so the 
motion on the floor has changed to B. If the timer expires and no member has proposed an 
amendment, the next proposal will be immediately considered.  
Ending a Period 
During the proposal stage, members may also propose to end the amendment process by 
selecting the motion on the floor for consideration as the subcommittee’s recommendation. If the 
proposal to end is seconded, all members must choose to either accept the motion on the floor or 
continue the amendment process. 
  
However, remember that while your subcommittee was choosing between a subset of letters, the 
other subcommittee was choosing between the other subset of letters. After both committees 
have recommended a letter, the committee as a whole will vote between the two 
recommendations. Again, your payoff depends entirely upon the decision by the committee as a 
whole. 
Ties in the Committee as a Whole 
In the event of a tie, the voting process will repeat itself, but a timer will begin to count down 
during which members may revote. If the timer expires and the committee still has not reached a 
decision, O will be the committee’s decision. If a decision is reached, everyone is paid 
accordingly. 
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Multiple Periods 
The entire process will be repeated over multiple periods. In each period, you will have different 
preferences, but you will retain the same member number and exchange rate. You will be paid 
the sum of the profits you make in each period.  
Phase 2: Introduction of a Convener (Committee Chairman) 
Similar to the previous phase, any member can propose an amendment. However, one member 
will be designated as a convener, who has the sole power to second a proposed amendment to the 
motion on the floor (except their own, which must be seconded by someone else). That is, you 
will only vote on proposed amendments seconded by the convener. Proposals to end and accept 
the motion on the floor differ in that any member may second a proposal to end (except the 
proposer).  
In the top left of the screen, you will be notified whether or not you are the convener. 
 
45 
 
Appendix 2: Screenshots 
 
 
Propose – Subjects may choose (with their mouse) to seek recognition by selecting an option 
from among the subset of feasible options (as shown in a thick outline). A timer counts down 
until it either reaches zero or everyone has sought recognition. From those seeking recognition, 
the computer chooses one at random, and that subject’s selection becomes the proposal. If no one 
seeks recognition within that timeframe, the program waits and accepts the first selection as the 
proposal. 
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Second – The proposed motion is bolded (and the other options deemphasized). If a subject that 
was not the initial proposer chooses to second the option, it proceeds to the next stage of voting. 
Otherwise, when the timer reaches zero, it returns to the previous Propose stage. 
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Vote – The two options that are being voted on are highlighted in orange. All subjects must 
choose one of the two options to vote for before the program proceeds. The winning option 
becomes the motion on the floor. The program then proceeds back to the Propose stage. 
 
 
Motion to End Debate – If the current motion on the floor is proposed, then there is a motion to 
end debate. All subjects must vote to either end discussion and choose the motion on the floor as 
the subcommittee’s choice or continue discussion (hence returning to the Propose stage).
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Appendix 3: Preference Inducement 
 
Preference Types and Preference Inducement 
 
A preference type is an ordering of the 15 alternatives. There are ten different types, contained in 
Table 1, each of which is assigned to a subject and induced as a preference in a given period. 
Figure 3 is a two dimensional spatial configuration of the ten types, with the numbered boxes as 
the location of the maximum for each type.   
 
For example, the preference ordering of the alternatives for Type 1 is in the first row of Table 1 
and has alternative L as the most preferred, G as the second most preferred, D as the third, etc. 
with the least preferred alternative for Type 1 being the alternative O. Type 1 is also illustrated in 
Figure 3, where the box containing the number 1 is the spatial location of the optimum for Type 
1 and the further the letter is from the optimum the lower is the level of preference. As shown, 
alternative L is the closest to the Type 1 optimum and the location of alternatives G and D are 
further, indicating that they are less preferred. All individuals have alternative O ranked lowest 
and thus alternative O is not shown in Figure 3. 
Table 3, the Subject Value Schedule, contains for each subject the monetary value of the fifteen 
alternatives given as a function of the rank of preference. For example, if the committee’s 
decision is a subject’s most preferred alternative, that subject receives a payoff of $2.50. If the 
decision is the subject’s second most preferred, the payoff is $2.33 and so on. Each step has a 
difference of 16.6 cents. For example, if the committee’s decision was L, the subject with Type 1 
would receive $2.50 while Type 3 would receive $1.83 and Type 6 would receive $0.33. 
 
The Assignment of Types to Subjects for Experimental Design and Testbeds 
 
The experimental design, outlined in Section 6, calls for two subcommittees. Each of the two 
subcommittees is assigned a subset of the fifteen alternatives. The status quo, alternative O, is 
available to both subcommittees as the default of no decision. In the experiments studied here, 
each subcommittee considered seven alternatives plus alternative O. Each subcommittee has five 
members and no one serves on both subcommittees. Thus, the ten subjects are partitioned into 
two subcommittees of five members each. 
 
Each of the ten types contained in Table 1 is assigned to one of the two subcommittees and will 
become the preference ordering of a committee member. The committee’s mechanism – simple 
Roberts Rules or Chairman – together with the five preference types and seven alternatives, are 
sufficient to determine the dominance relation discussed in the theory of Section 6.   
Rotations and Permutations 
Two procedures were employed to avoid the possibility that the assignment of types to subjects 
carried information about the environment and the possible preferences of other subjects. First, 
the letter assignments were permuted each period. That is, the letter assigned to the original 
alternative A became some other letter, such as F. Second, whenever the same environment was 
repeated, the types were rotated among the same subjects. For example, subjects 1,2,3,4,5 would 
be assigned types 3,4,6,9,10 in one repetition and 4,6,9,10,3 in another. 
 
